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Abstract— This article measures the advantage granted 
by  the  European  Union  to  different  Mediterranean 
countries  in  the  fruit  and  vegetables  sector  in  the 
framework  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Association 
Agreements.  The  advantage  of  each  country  are 
evaluated  by  calculating  the  value  of  the  preferential 
margins,  which  compares  the  amount  of  the  customs 
duties paid by an exporting country with the amount of 
the  duties  this  country  would  have  paid  if  it  had  not 
enjoyed  tariff  preferences.  The  situation  of  the 
Mediterranean countries appears to be highly unequal 
in terms of the advantages granted by the EU in the fruit 
and  vegetables  sector.  The  progress  of  bilateral 
negotiations  and  the  export  structure  in  each  country 
explain the significant variations in preferential margins 
from  one  Mediterranean  country  to  the  next.  These 
results  allow  us  to  discuss  the  potential  impacts  of  a 
liberalisation  of  fruit  and  vegetable  trade  within  the 
Euro-Mediterranean zone.  
Keywords—  Euromediterranean  agreements, 
preferential margin, fruit and vegetables. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The  Mediterranean  countries  are  involved  in 
preferential  agreements  with  the  European  Union in 
the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean process. As 
such, they enjoy tariff concessions for access to the 
Community  market,  especially  within  the  fruit  and 
vegetable sector, which are their main exports to the 
European  market.  As  each  agreement  is  being 
negotiated separately, there is a significant degree of 
heterogeneity among Mediterranean Countries in the 
level  of  protection  applied  by  the  EU  for  fruit  and 
vegetables.  Israel,  for  example,  only  benefits  from 
preferential regime for 20% of tariffs lines, whereas 
more  than  70%  of  tariffs  lines  of  the  other 
Mediterranean  countries  are  concerned.  Given  the 
complexity of the European system of protection for 
fruit and vegetables, computing number of tariffs lines 
with preferential regime is not sufficient to compare 
the level of preference granted to each Mediterranean 
country. Indeed, the tariff concessions concern various 
instruments (ad valorem duties, specific duties, Entry 
Price System), some of which are only applied to a 
limited volume of trade and to certain period of the 
year. 
The aim of this article is to evaluate the advantage 
resulting from the preferences granted by the EU to 
the  different  Mediterranean  countries.  We  calculate 
what is referred to as the value of preferential margins, 
which compares the amount of customs duties paid by 
countries  supplying  the  EU  with  the  amount  of 
customs duties these countries would have paid if they 
did  not  benefit  from  tariff  preferences.  This 
calculation measures the extent of the gains linked to 
the allocation of preferences by the EU enjoyed by the 
different  exporting  countries  (Yamazaki  1996  [1], 
Tangermann  2002  [2],  Cipollina  and  Salvatici  2007 
[3]).  
Grethe et al (2005) [4] already calculated the values 
of preferential margins of Mediterranean countries on 
the  EU  market  for  all  agricultural  products,  at  the 
aggregated  level.  In  this  paper,  we  propose  a  more 
disaggregated estimation of these values on the fruit 
and  vegetable  sector,  taking  into  account  the 
seasonality  of  tariffs  and  trade  and  the  different 
instruments of protection (tariffs quotas, Entry Price 
System),  at  the  product  level.  We  also  propose  an 
explanation of the differences of value of preferential 
margin  between  Mediterranean  countries.  We  show 
especially  that  export  structure  of  Mediterranean   2 
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countries explain to a large extent the variation in the 
level of the margins within the Mediterranean zone. 
As  euromediterranean  agreements  are  about  to  be 
renegotiated, we also discuss in this paper the potential 
effect  of  an  enhancement  of  tariffs  preferences  for 
Mediterranean  countries  in  the  fruit  and  vegetable 
sector.  We  measure  the  impact  of  harmonisation  of 
preferences within the Mediterranean area in order to 
see  how  the  Mediterranean  countries  would  be 
affected in case of a trade liberalisation process with 
the European Union in the fruit and vegetables sector, 
that would move from a bilateral to a regional scheme. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: 
In the first, we quickly present the main characteristics 
of the EU protection system. In the second, we present 
the calculations of the values of preferential margins 
which we performed for all suppliers of the European 
market. In the third section, of the article, we explain 
the level of the margins within the Mediterranean zone 
with  differences  in  export  structure  and  degree  of 
European preferences. Finally, in the final section we 
calculate the modified value of preferential margins in 
the  event  of  a  harmonisation  of  European  customs 
duties vis-à-vis the Mediterranean countries.  
II. THE EU’S PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR 
FRUIT AND VEGETABLES 
Most fruit and vegetables exported to the EU are 
subject to ad-valorem duties (in percentage) as well as 
specific duties (in €/kg). Furthermore, for a number of 
products considered “sensitive”
1, the European Union 
has implemented a system of special protection called 
“the  Entry  Price  System”  in  order  to  limit  price 
fluctuations and to avoid the presence on the European 
Market  of  goods  whose  prices  are  too  low.  In  this 
system, the level of the duties depends on the import 
price of the product. The European Union defines, for 
each  product,  a  threshold  price,  also  called  “trigger 
price”.  In cases when the import price is higher than 
this threshold price, only an ad valorem duty is applied 
(case  1  in  Figure  1).  But  when  the  import  price  is 
lower  than  the  trigger  price,  then  a  specific  duty  is 
levied in addition to the ad valorem duty (case 2 in 
                                                            
1. Tomatoes,  Cucumbers  and  gherkins,  Artichokes,  Courgettes, 
Oranges, Tangerines, Clementines, Lemons and Limes, Apples, 
Pears, Apricots, Cherries, Peaches, Prunes and Grapes 
Figure 1). The amount of this specific duty is equal to 
the difference between the import price and the trigger 
price.  Finally,  when  the  import  price  is  lower  than 
92% of the trigger price, then a specific duty is fixed 
and is equal to the “maximum specific duty” fixed by 
the EU (case 3 in Figure 1).  
 
 
Fig. 1 The Entry Price system 
Variations,  over  the  year,  in  the  tariff  levels  are 
another characteristic of the EU’s fruit and vegetables’ 
protection system. This seasonality of the protections 
is related to the production calendar of the EU: Indeed, 
ad valorem duties and also trigger prices vary over the 
year from one product to another.  
The preferences granted by the EU to its different 
partners  in  the  framework  of  its  preferential 
agreements involve the different protection tools used 
by  the  EU.  Thus,  preferences  can  consist  in  a 
reduction (or elimination) of the ad valorem duty, in a 
reduction of the trigger price, or, for the products that 
are not subject to the entry-price system, in a reduction 
or  elimination  of  the  specific  duties.  Furthermore, 
these  ad  valorem  or  specific  duty  concessions  can 
either  be  extended  to  all  goods  imported  from  the 
partner  country,  or  limited  in  volume,  in  the 
framework of tariff quotas. Trigger prices, however, 
can only be reduced within quota limits. It must be 
noted that in cases where a tariff quota system applies, 
imports  out  of  quota  can  also  benefit  from  tariff 
preferences, though they are not as significant as those 
granted within the quota.    3 
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III. PREFERENTIAL MARGINS – 
CALCULATING GAINS IN RELATION TO 
TARIFF PREFERENCES 
The value of preferential margins corresponds to the 
gains resulting from the reduction in customs duties 
granted  by  the  EU  to  a  country.  It  is  equal  to  the 
difference between the duties in euros that the country 
would have paid for its exports towards the EU if it 
did not enjoy any preferences and the duties actually 
paid for the same volume of exports while benefiting 
from the tariff concessions. It can be calculated with 





k k j X t MFN MV ∑ - =
 
where j is the exporting country toward EU, k is the 
product,  k MFN  is the MFN rate applied by EU to the 
product k, 
j
k t is the tariff applied by EU to country j, 
on product k. 
We  assume  here  that  the  preferences  are 
systematically used by the exporting countries and that 
they  always  collect  the  gains  generated  by  the 
preferences. This assumption is plausible (Bureau and 
Gallezot  2005,  Bureau  et  al  2007),  but  the  gains 
resulting from the allocation of preferences may not be 
collected  by  the  exporting  countries,  in  particular 
when tariff contingents are applied. Thus the value of 
preferential margins must be considered as a potential 
rather  than  an  effective  gain  resulting  from  tariffs 
preferences.     
The  protection  and  trade  databases  (TARIC  and 
COMEXT), which are not classified using the same 
nomenclature, were first harmonised in order to obtain 
values of preferential margins at level NC8 for each 
month  of  the  year.  For  products  subject  to  tariff 
quotas,  we  took  into  consideration  the  rate  of 
fulfilment  of  these  quotas  for  each  period  of 
application in order to obtain a precise calculation of 
the duties paid when the preferences were applied. For 
instance,  if  the  quota  is  filled,  the  margin  for  the 
product with quota  










k Q X t MFN Q t MFN MV - - + - =  
where 
Qj
k t  is the tariff quota rate for k, 
j HQ
k t
,  is the 
tariff out of quota and 
i
k Q  is the level of the quota.  
 For products subject to an Entry Price System we 
used  the  data  for  the  Standard  Import  Value
2  to 
calculate  the  value  of  the  specific  duties  applied  to 
each origin for the different months of 2004, taking 
into account the MFN or preferential trigger prices as 
necessary.  In  the  case  of  products  benefiting  from 
several  EU  preferences,  our  calculations 
systematically  considered  the  highest  preference
3. 
Table  1
4  presents  the  sum  of  values  of  preferential 
margins for each zone of suppliers.  
The  signatories  of  the  Africa  Caribbean  Pacific 
agreements appear to be the main beneficiaries of the 
preferences allocated by the EU, as they collect 64% 
of the total value of preferential margins whereas they 
represent only 8% of EU imports. The countries in the 
Mediterranean zone collect 19% of the total value of 
preferential  margins  allocated  by  the  EU.  Table  2 
presents the details for each Mediterranean country
5.  
Among  the  Mediterranean  countries,  Turkey, 
Morocco, Egypt and Israel collect the vast majority of 
the value of preferential margins in the Mediterranean 
zone  (96%  in  total  Table  2).  Of  these  countries, 
Morocco is the main beneficiary of the preferences, 
receiving 41% of this value which is higher than its 
share  in  the  total  trade  within  the  zone  (24.4%). 
Turkey collects 34% of the margin which, although a 
large sum, is nevertheless lower than its share of the 
EU market (45% of imports from the zone). Similarly, 
the proportion of the preferential margin received by 
Israel (11%) is lower than its share of exports (18%). 
Few products benefit from the preferences inside of 
the  Entry  Price  System  (tomatoes,  cucumbers, 
courgettes,  clementines  and  oranges  in  Morocco, 
oranges in Egypt and Israel), but they represent a large 
proportion of both the trade in these countries and the 
value of their preferential margins on the EU market 
(Table 3). 62% of the value of preferential margins in 
Morocco  results  from  products  enjoying  preferential 
                                                            
2. These  values  correspond  to  average  import  prices  calculated 
daily by the European Commission for each product and each 
origin 
3. This  hypothesis  is  debatable  insofar  as  certain  preferential 
regimes are systematically preferred to others, in particular due 
to  origin  regulations,  even  if  they  do  not  provide  the  largest 
reduction in customs duties (Bureau et al 2007 [5]) 
4. The  preferential  margin  of  the new  EU  member  states  is  not 
calculated as these countries joined the EU in June 2004 
5.  We do not have any export data for Palestine   4 
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trigger  prices  whereas  these  products  only  represent 
51% of its exports. 
The values of preferential margins granted by the 
EU  to  each  of  its  supplier  countries  are  highly 
dependent on their level of exportation. Hence, these 
values  do  not  allow  us  to  compare  the  advantages 
granted to the different countries through the European 
preferences.  Dividing  the  values  of  preferential 
margins  by  the  value  of  exports  for  each  exporting 
country  eliminates  this  “size”  effect.  The  value 
obtained,  which  we  refer  to  as  the  weighted 
preferential margin Mweight, enables us to compare the 
preferences  granted  by  the  EU  by  relating  each 
country’s gain resulting from the tariff preferences to 
its exports to the EU.  
Comparing the weighted preferential margins Mweight 
of the different zones of supplier countries (Figure 2) 
again highlights the high level of preference enjoyed 
by the ACP countries on the EU market. The margin 
represents more than 60% of the value of their exports. 
Globally speaking, the Mediterranean countries record 
relatively weak weighted gains compared to the other 
zones, 8% only. The extent of the value of preferential 
margins in this zone (Table 2) can be explained by the 
volume  of  its  exports  to  the  European  market  (the 




Turkey  and  Israel  collect  a  large  proportion  of  the 
value of preferential margins MV granted by the EU to 
the  Mediterranean  zone  (Table  2).  Nevertheless, 
compared  to  the  total  value  of  their  fruit  and 
vegetables  exports  to  EU,  these  benefits  are  much 
lower than that of other countries, indicating that these 
two countries benefits less from the preference granted 
by  the  EU  than  the  other  Mediterranean  countries. 
Lebanon, to which the EU grants reductions or even 
exemptions  of  duties  for  a  large  majority  of  its 
products,  also  records  a  relatively  low  weighted 
preferential margin.  
Egypt  and  Morocco,  record  high  weighted 
preferential  margins,  indicating  that  the  gains 
generated by the tariff reductions granted by the EU 
are  relatively  large  in  relation  to  their  exports.  The 
country  with  the  highest  weighted  margin  (22%)  is 
Jordan.  Although  it  collects  only  1%  of  the  overall 
margins  received  by  the  entire  Mediterranean  zone, 
this  value  is  high  in  relation  to  the  volume  of  its 







Proportion of total 
preferential 
margin granted by 
the EU 
Value of exports 





Countries benefiting from no preferences  0  0%  1,996,927  17% 
Countries benefiting from the GSP  50,220  5%  3,092,668  27% 
ACP countries  593,495  64%  934,349  8% 
Least developed countries  8,999  1%  164,323  1% 
Mediterranean countries  178,518  19%  2,454,448  21% 
Countries enjoying a preference within the 
framework of the neighbourhood policy  2,151  0%  16 149  0% 
Countries benefiting from other bilateral 
agreements  76,405  8%  2,857,750  25% 
Overseas territories  44  0%  440  0% 
Balkan countries  18,195  2%  145,276  1% 
TOTAL  928,025  100%  11,662,331  100% 
Table 1 Values of preferential margins granted by the EU to its different suppliers in the fruit and vegetables sector, 2004 
 
Our calculations based on MEDITAR and COMEXT   5 
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Value of preferential 
margin (in thousands of 
euros) 
Proportion of total 
preferential margin 
granted by the EU 
Value of exports to the 
EU (in thousands of 
euros) 
Share of European 
market 
Algeria  618  0%  12,663  1% 
Egypt  18,493  10%  218,010  9% 
Israel  19,665  11%  439,670  18% 
Jordan  1,156  1%  5,317  0% 
Lebanon  44  0%  830  0% 
Morocco  72,446  41%  598,824  24% 
Syria  383  0%  5,872  0% 
Tunisia  4,959  3%  76,493  3% 
Turkey  60,753  34%  1,096,768  45% 
TOTAL  178,517  100%  2,454,448  100% 
 
Value of preferential margin 
resulting from products with 
preferential trigger prices 
(thousands of €) 
Total value of the 
preferential margin 
(thousands of €) 
Share of products with preferential 
trigger prices as a proportion of 
the total value of preferential 
margin 
Egypt  3,109  18,493  17% 
Israel  1,620  19,665  8% 
Morocco  44,640  72,446  62% 
Table 2 Values of preferential margins granted by the EU to the Mediterranean countries in the fruit and vegetables 
sector, 2004 
Table 3 Share of products with preferential trigger prices as a proportion of the value of preferential margin in Morocco, 
Egypt and Israel, 2004 
Figure 2. Weighted preferential margin on the EU market per supplier zone in the fruit and vegetables sector, 2004 
Our calculations based on MEDITAR and COMEXT 
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   6 
12



















IV. THE DIFFERENCES IN WEIGHTED 
PREFERENTIAL MARGINS ARE FOR THE 
MOST PART EXPLAINED BY THE EXPORT 
STRUCTURE 
Jordan, Morocco and Egypt are the countries which 
draw the greatest gain from the preferences granted by 
the  EU  in  the  fruit  and  vegetables  sector.  The 
preferences granted by the EU to the Lebanon provide 
it  with  only  limited  gains,  although  it  enjoys 
reductions  in  customs  duties  on  numerous  products. 
Low weighted preferential margins Mweight may result 
from one of two factors: either the countries export 
products which are already subject to relatively little 
taxation  within  the  framework  of  multilateral 
agreements (low MFN duties), or the duties applied 
inside  the  preferences  remain  high  despite  the 
preferences.   
In order to distinguish between these two factors, 
we breakdown the expression of weighted preferential 
margin  Mweight  into  two  component:  the  first 
corresponds  to  the  value,  weighted  by  trade,  of  the 
duties which would have been paid if the country did 
not benefit from preferences; the second corresponds 
to the value, weighted by trade, of the duties actually 
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The MFN duties which would theoretically be paid 
by Lebanon and Turkey are particularly low (5% and 
6%  respectively,  Figure  4).  The  weak  weighted 
preferential  margin  in  these  countries  is  therefore 
explained by their specialisation in exports of products 
subject  to  low  taxation  in  the  framework  of 
multilateral agreements (hazelnuts, dried fruits, chick 
peas  and  lentils  in  Turkey;  dried  pod  vegetables  in 
Lebanon). It is therefore the export structure of these 
countries which is the root cause of their low Mweight, a 
phenomenon  similar  to  what  Bouët  et  al  (2005)  [6] 
called the “structure effect”. We may also observe that 
Lebanon pays no customs duties to enter the European 
market  and  that  the  duties  paid  by  Turkey  are  also 
very low.  
The  “structure”  effect  also  explains  the  high 
weighted  preferential  margins  Mweight  observed  for 
Egypt,  Morocco  and  Jordan.  Without  preferences, 
these  countries  would  pay  particularly  high  duties 
upon entering the European market (12, 16 and 27% 
of their trade) whereas, thanks to the tariff preferences, 
they  pay  only  relatively  small  duties  which  are 
nevertheless  higher  than  those  paid  by  Turkey  or 
Lebanon. Specialisation in exporting products with  
Figure 3. Weighted preferential margin on the EU market for different Mediterranean countries, 2004 
Our calculations based on MEDITAR and COMEXT 
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high MFN duties (various fresh vegetables, potatoes), 
i.e. the structure of their foreign trade, is therefore the 
reason for the high Mweight in these three countries. In 
the  case  of  Israel,  the  “structure  effect”  has  only  a 
limited  impact  on  the  weighted  preferential  margin, 
Mweight. Without the benefit of preferences, this country 
would  pay  average  weighted  duties  similar  to  those 
paid by Algeria, Tunisia or Syria. The explanation for 
the poor weighted preferential margin of this country 
lies more in the low level of preferences allocated.  
These  results  allow  us  to  evaluate  the  extent  to 
which the different Mediterranean countries might be 
affected by the liberalisation of the fruit and vegetable 
trade. Countries which primarily export products with 
low MFN duties, such as Turkey or Lebanon, already 
pay  few  or  no  duties  when  entering  the  European 
market. The room for liberalisation is therefore limited 
in these countries: a reduction in EU customs duties 
would  have  only  a  very  limited  impact  on  their 
exports.    
An  increase  in  tariff  concessions  would  have  a 
greater  impact  in  countries  which,  despite  their 
preferences, currently pay the highest duties for access 
to the European market, i.e. Israel, Algeria and Tunisia 
as  well  as  Jordan,  Morocco  and  Egypt.  The  latter, 






















MFN  protection  for  which  they  enjoy  large 
preferences, could moreover suffer negative effects in 
The latter, specialised in exporting products with high 
rates of MFN protection for which they enjoy large 
preferences, could moreover suffer negative effects in 
the event of reductions in consolidated duties in the 
framework  of  multilateral  negotiations.  These 
reductions  could  reduce  their  advantage  on  the 
European  market  by  eroding  their  preferential 
margins.  These  three  countries  would  consequently 
benefit if the bilateral negotiations were to result in an 
increase in the current preferences, but would lose out 
in  the  event  of  a  generalisation  of  European 
preferences to other suppliers in the framework of the 
WTO.  
V. VARIATION IN PREFERENTIAL 
MARGINS IN THE EVENT OF THE 
STANDARDISATION OF CUSTOMS 
DUTIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ZONE 
From  this  analysis  of the  margins  structure,  what 
can  we  conclude  about  a  deeper  liberalization  for 
Mediterranean  Countries?  What  is  the  room  of 
manoeuvre? Which benefits can they expect? The on-
going  negotiations  are  about  the  enlargement  of  the 
Figure 4. Percentage of duties, weighted by trade, paid by the Mediterranean countries, 2004 
Our calculations based on MEDITAR and COMEXT 
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quotas or of the preferential “windows”. Nevertheless, 
a radical manner to measure the impact of a greater 
liberalization is to align, product by product, all the 
tariffs on the “most favoured tariffs” applied by the 
EU  to  the  Mediterranean  countries.  Thus,  in  this 
scenario,  the  duties  applied  to  each  Mediterranean 
country correspond to the highest preferences
6 that the 
EU has granted within the zone. Hence, we calculate 
the new value of preferential margin in the event of a 
harmonisation  of  preferences  in  the  Mediterranean 
basin and we compare them with those of the current 
situation, the structure of exports being equal (Table 
4). 
 
Table 4. Percentage increase in the value of preferential 
margin in each country assuming a generalisation of the 
preferences granted to all countries in the Mediterranean 
zone, calculated using data from 2004 
 




Lebanon  0% 
Egypt  9% 
Morocco  13% 
Syria  16% 
Turkey  25% 
Jordan  26% 
Tunisia  42% 
Israel  56% 
Algeria  57% 
Our calculations based on MEDITAR and COMEXT 
 
Algeria,  Israel  and  Tunisia  would  gain  the  most 
from this scenario. These countries enjoy preferences 
on  a  relatively  small  number  of  products  and  their 
current  weighted  preferential  margins  are  relatively 
limited.  Aligning  their  preferences  with  those  of 
Morocco  and  Tunisia  would  lead  to  a  significant 
increase  in  the  value  of  their  preferential  margin. 
Lebanon,  Egypt  and  Morocco,  on  the  other  hand, 
would  only  experience  a  very  small  increase  in  the 
value  of  their  preferential  margin  in  the  event  of  a 
harmonisation of preferences. These countries already 
benefit from tariff concessions for most products. We 
have  also  seen  that  Lebanon  pays  almost  no  duties 
                                                            
6.  Consequently,  we  apply  the  preferential  trigger  prices  to  all 
countries in the zone for the products concerned. 
when  importing  to  the  European  market  and  that 
Egypt and Morocco primarily export products which 
enjoy significant preferences, in particular preferential 
trigger prices, thus explaining why the alignment of 
preferences  in  Mediterranean  countries  would  not 
provide additional preferences for these countries 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Two  elements  which  provide  a  platform  for 
discussing the potential impacts of trade liberalisation 
in the fruit and vegetables sector have been calculated 
for each country in the Mediterranean zone: the level 
of  preferential  margins  and  the  value  of  duties 
currently paid to enter the EU market. The smaller the 
preferential margins and the higher the value of duties 
paid, the greater the impact of a reduction in European 
customs duties on the exports of these countries would 
be. 
 Lebanon  and  Turkey,  which  enjoy  tariff 
concessions  for  most  products,  do  not  benefit  from 
large preferential margins for access to the European 
market.  These  countries  primarily  export  products 
subject  to  low  taxation  in  the  framework  of 
multilateral agreements, meaning that they gain very 
little from their preferences. As they pay very little, or 
even nothing, in terms of customs duties, trade in these 
countries  would  experience  very  little  change  if 
European customs duties were reduced.  
Egypt,  Morocco  and  Jordan,  on  the  other  hand, 
enjoy  large  preferential  margins  from  the  European 
Union.  These  countries  export  products  with  high 
MFN duties, for which the EU grants significant tariff 
reductions. As these three countries pay high customs 
duties, a reduction in these duties could improve their 
already  highly  favourable  access  to  the  European 
market.  
The preferential margins of Israel on the EU market 
are  small  in  relation  to  the  other  Mediterranean 
countries.  This  country  enjoys  only  very  few 
preferences, mostly limited in quantity. It is therefore 
the  country  which  would  theoretically  be  most 
affected by trade liberalisation within the zone. 
A  harmonization  of  preferences  within  the 
Mediterranean  area  or  a  fall  in  MFN  duties  would 
have a negative effect in Morocco, Jordan and Egypt.  
Indeed,  these  countries,  that  have  the  highest   9 
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preferences and that export products with high MFN 
duties, could have their preferences eroded by regional 
or multilateral reductions of duties.  
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